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ABSTRACT 
 
Extant findings show that voter fraud is extremely rare and difficult to prove in the United States. 
Voter’s knowledge about voter fraud allegations likely comes through the media, who tend to 
sensationalize the issue. In this study, we argue that the more voters are exposed to media coverage 
of voter fraud allegations, the more likely that they will perceive that voter fraud is a frequent 
problem. We merge the 2012 Survey of Performance of American Elections with state-level media 
coverage of voter fraud leading up to the 2012 election. Our results show that media coverage of 
voter fraud is associated with public beliefs about voter fraud. In states where fraud was more 
frequently featured in local media outlets, public concerns about voter fraud were heightened.   In 
particular, we find that press attention to voter fraud has a larger influence on Republicans than 
Democrats and Independents. We further find that media coverage of voter fraud does not further 
polarize partisan perceptions of voter fraud. Rather, political interest moderates state media coverage 
on voter fraud beliefs only among Republicans. Lastly, our results provide no support that 
demographic changes, approval of election administration, or information concerning actual reported 
voting irregularities have any discernable effects on partisan perceptions. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Extensive research has shown that voter fraud is extremely rare and difficult to prove in the 
U.S. (Minnite 2010; Ahlquist, Mayer and Jackman 2014; Ansolabehere, Luks, and Schaffner 2015). 
Before recent major state elections, some Republican election officials have alleged that thousands of 
illegal voters are registered to vote. Subsequent investigations, though, reveal a much smaller number 
of voting irregularities and an even lesser number of actual cases that showed intent (Minnite 2010). 
Voters typically hear about voter fraud allegations in the media, which scholars have shown tends to 
sensationalize some issues at times while also having a powerful influence over who should be 
blamed for public dilemmas (Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Cook 1998; Hamilton 2004). This raises a 
concerning trend in democratic politics and contemporary election reforms, as some have pointed 
out, partisans can easily insert allegations of voter fraud into public discourse as well as the 
congressional record and portray those allegations as “facts” (Minnite, 2010, pg 10). 
To date, minimal research has shown the extent to which media coverage of voter fraud 
allegations affects public perceptions of how widespread voter fraud is in U.S. elections. Extant 
scholarship has often relied on contextual factors such as party control of state legislatures, the 
enactment of voter restrictions (Bowler and Donavan 2016), and the performance of election 
administrators. Other attitudinal studies suggest that demographic shifts in the foreign-born 
population (Udani and Kimball 2017) and black population (Wilson and Brewer 2013) may trigger 
white native-born animosity toward racial minority voters and raise anxiety of diminishing political 
influence. In this study, we pose an alternative and untested explanation of the reasons that the 
public perceives that voter fraud is rampant in U.S. elections. That is, voters who live in states with a 
higher incidence of news stories on voter fraud are more likely to think that voter fraud occurs more 
frequently in U.S. elections than those who live in state with a lower incidence of new stories.  
Merging data from the 2012 Survey of the Performance of American Elections (SPAE) with 
a novel dataset of local media coverage of voter fraud allegations in the 2012 election, we test 
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dominant theoretical frameworks that might explain the reasons for which one’s political contextual 
environments influence voter fraud perceptions. We find that media coverage of voter fraud is 
associated with public beliefs about voter fraud. In states where voter fraud was more frequently 
featured in local media outlets, public concerns about voter fraud were heightened. Our results 
provide the strongest evidence that Republicans with more political interest – which has been shown 
as a motivator to learn about politics, acquire political knowledge, and recognize party differences on 
issues (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Luskin 1990; Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2010) – are 
more likely to perceive that voter fraud occurs frequently in U.S. elections. While we also find that 
Republican control of the state legislature assuages politically interested Republicans perceptions of 
voter fraud, our results provide no support that state-level demographic changes, approval of 
election administration, or information concerning actual reported voting irregularities have any 
discernable effects on public perceptions of voter fraud.   
We organize the paper as follows. First, we derive and propose testable hypotheses from 
relevant scholarship on how contextual environments shape political attitudes. After discussing the 
data and methods used to test our hypotheses, we present our main findings and then offer a 
discussion of other relevant results. Finally, we conclude the paper with closing remarks. 
CONTEXTUAL SOURCES OF VOTER FRAUD PERCEPTIONS 
Previous research indicates that several political predispositions are associated with public 
beliefs about voter fraud. Elite policy debates about voter fraud and proposed voting restrictions in 
the United States are highly partisan, with Republicans generally favoring and Democrats opposing 
stricter voter identification policies (Hasen 2012; Dreier and Martin 2010; Hicks et al. 2015). The 
public seems to have internalized these debates, as Republicans and conservatives tend to believe that 
voter fraud occurs more frequently than Democrats and liberals (Wilson and Brewer 2013; Bowler et 
al. 2015). Voter fraud beliefs are also associated with broader orientations toward the political system. 
For example, voters and people with higher levels of political efficacy and trust in government tend 
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to be more sanguine about election integrity (Gronke 2014; Wolak 2014; Uscinski and Parent 2014). 
Similarly, those with higher levels of education and political knowledge tend to hold more optimistic 
views about voter confidence and election fraud (Bowler et al. 2015; Wolak 2014), while others show 
that beliefs about voter fraud are also shaped by attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities (Udani 
and Kimball 2017; Wilson and Brewer 2013). 
Few studies, though, have attended to the information contexts in which people formulate 
attitudes toward voter fraud. As Atkeson (2014) notes, the vast majority of people do not witness or 
experience voter fraud directly, but they learn about it through the news media. Voter fraud 
allegations are often sufficiently lurid to grab and hold headlines (Levitt 2007). News coverage of 
voter fraud varies substantially from one state to the next (Fogarty et al. 2015). In addition, reporting 
on alleged voter fraud is heaviest during the weeks leading up to a major election, particularly in 
electorally competitive states, suggesting that voter fraud allegations are used as a voter mobilization 
strategy (Fogarty et al. 2015).  
As the public is quite susceptible to allegations and rumors of election fraud (Beaulieu 2014), 
contextual information such as news coverage of voter fraud allegations can shape public beliefs 
about election integrity. Given that much of the rhetoric of voter fraud is coming from Republican 
and conservative elites (Hasen 2012; Minnite 2010; Dreier and Martin 2010; Ellis 2014), not all 
members of the public will be equally receptive of these messages (Zaller 1992). We expect that news 
coverage of voter fraud in a state will have more of an effect on the perceptions of Republicans than 
Democrats (H1). 
In addition, we also anticipate that media coverage of voter fraud will not have the same 
effects on all Republican identifiers. Higher levels of political interest – which is viewed as a 
precursor to political knowledge and activism – contribute to more awareness of party differences 
(Luskin 1990; Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2010). Other studies suggest that politically interested 
partisans are motivated to learn about politics and provide answers that are consistent with partisan 
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elite positions (Nadeau and Niemi 1995; Prior and Lupia 2008; Prior 2010; but see Dancey and 
Sheagley 2013). Thus, politically interested Republicans should view voter fraud allegations in line 
with party elite rhetoric on voter fraud. We expect that political interest will moderate the effects of 
local media coverage on Republican perceptions of voter fraud (H2). 
Aside from media effects on political attitudes, there are contextual factors that may also 
influence voter fraud perceptions. However, we argue, and find, that none are more influential than 
the role of the media and its coverage of voter fraud. Following is a discussing of four dominant 
competing hypotheses. 
Election administration 
Public beliefs about election integrity may be influenced by actual instances of voter fraud. It 
is plausible that the number of cases of voter fraud would influence Republicans more than 
Democrats, particularly politically interested Republicans who are expected to be tuned into their 
party’s line on election integrity. To date, there is little evidence that the frequency of voter fraud 
incidents is associated with beliefs about election fairness.  For example, research has found that state 
media coverage of voter fraud allegations is unrelated to the actual number of fraud cases in a state 
(Fogarty et al. 2015). Highlighting the rare occurrence of verifiable fraudulent voting is likely to not 
matter for many voters who, as research and public discourse has shown, understand the issue of 
voter fraud as synonymous with partisanship (Ansolabehere and Persily 2008; Bowler and Donovan 
2016; Wilson and Brewer 2013). Other findings further suggest that public beliefs about voter fraud 
is not based heavily on objective evidence of fraud, as supporters of winning candidates (regardless 
of party) express more confidence in election integrity than supporters of losing candidates (Sances 
and Stewart 2014; Beaulieu 2014; Wolak 2014; Uscinski and Parent 2014). 
There is lesser evidence that state election laws influence public concerns about election 
integrity. Proposals to require voters to show photo identification have been the most contentious 
state election reforms in recent years. Conventional wisdom suggests that living in a state with higher 
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levels of public confidence in elections or more restrictive voter ID requirements should assuage 
voter fraud perceptions among Republicans as well as Republicans with higher political interest. 
While the adoption of photo ID laws polarizes confidence in state elections (Bowler and Donovan 
2016), public concerns about voter fraud do not seem to have diminished in states that have passed 
strict photo ID laws (Ansolabehere and Persily 2008; Bowler et al. 2015; Bowler and Donovan 2016).  
Other studies indicate that poorly administered elections can foster pessimism of election 
integrity in a state. There is some evidence that public confidence in elections is associated with the 
performance of election administrators at the state level (Bowler et al. 2015) and at the local level 
(Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Hall, Monson, and Patterson 2009; Gronke 2014). When registration 
and voting procedures operate smoothly the public is more likely to believe in the fairness of 
elections. Hence, we expect that public confidence in elections within a state will have more of an 
impact on Republicans than Democrats. Further, in states with lower levels of public confidence in 
elections, politically interested Republicans are more likely than uninterested ones to believe that 
voter fraud occurs more frequently. 
Partisan control of state legislature 
Partisan control of government institutions may also influence public beliefs about voter 
fraud. Studies show that fears about voter fraud are pushed almost exclusively by conservative 
activists and Republican Party elites, while liberal groups and Democratic Party elites spread concerns 
that voting restrictions may disenfranchise some voters (Hasen 2012; Dreier and Martin 2010). These 
competing and divergent partisan elite stances on voter fraud and election reforms have filtered 
down to voters, whose opinions have largely become divided across major party lines (Bowler and 
Donovan 2016; Bowler and Donovan 2013). Due to the rare occurrence of voter fraud and the 
public’s limited understanding of the complexity in detecting actual intent (Levitt 2007), voters search 
for their own respective party’s position as well as its successes and failures to inform their own 
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perceptions of voter fraud.  This may involve actively searching for elites’ positions via websites and 
Twitter, or more passively through the news media.  
Response to election outcomes 
 Although voter fraud may be a more prominent issue in states with Republican-controlled 
state government, there is strong evidence of a “sore loser” effect, with supporters of winning 
candidates offering more positive assessments of election integrity than supporters of losing 
candidates (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn 2008; Sances and Stewart 2015; Wolak 2014; Beaulieu 2014). 
More generally, election winners tend to report higher levels of support for democratic institutions 
and processes than losers (e.g., Nadeau and Blais 1993; Norris 1999; Anderson et al. 2005; Craig et al. 
2006). Thus, we expect partisans of the governing majority will provide more upbeat evaluations of 
election integrity (i.e., presence of voter fraud) than members of the minority party. 
Racial and Acculturation Threat Theory 
Political rhetoric about voter fraud frequently incorporates elements of an immigrant threat 
narrative, including hostile language and fears about crime and loss of political power (Schildkraut 
2011; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Many voter fraud allegations depict immigrants in a negative light. 
Not only do the allegations presume that undocumented immigrants are to blame, but that instances 
of noncitizen “voting” are intentional acts of breaking the law and not due to administrative lapses in 
registration or inherent human error by poll workers (Udani and Kimball 2017). For example, 
President Trump made repeated claims about illegal voting by immigrants before and after the 2016 
general election, including his unsubstantiated claim that he lost the popular vote in the 2016 election 
because three to five million undocumented immigrants participated illegally in the election (House 
and Dennis 2017). In congressional testimony, Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach alleged that 
“the problem of aliens registering to vote is a massive one, nationwide” (Kobach 2015). In ordering a 
statewide effort to remove immigrants from the voter rolls, Florida Governor Rick Scott (R-FL) 
warned about the votes of American citizens being “diluted” by non-citizens (Mishak 2013). The 
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recent increase in immigration, combined with elite rhetoric and media coverage that stereotype non-
citizens as criminals, prime attitudes toward immigrants when Americans think about voter fraud 
(Udani and Kimball 2017). 
The public should perceive voter fraud as very common in racially and ethnically 
homogenous areas where immigrants have historically been absent (Alexseev 2006; Green et al. 
1998). As the foreign-born population in the United States has grown at an increasing rate over the 
last 50 years, studies have also shown an increase in population dispersion across the country, as 
immigrants settle in “new destination” states, cities and rural areas that have not experienced much 
immigration since the 1960s (Marrow, 2005; Singer, 2004).  Traditional destination states – such as 
New York, Illinois, California, Texas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Florida –  continue to receive 
large numbers of foreign-born; however, in primarily southern and midwestern states, the population 
of the foreign born grew by 49 percent or more, twice the national rate between 2000 and 2009 
(Terrazas 2011; Passel and Cohn 2011).1 Estimates derived by Robert Warren and John Warren 
(2013) show that many of the new destination states also experienced the highest growth rates in the 
undocumented population between 1990 and 2010. 
It is plausible that people who are predisposed to believing that voter fraud is rampant in 
U.S. elections are also sensitive to foreign-born population growth within their state.  Newman and 
colleagues (2012) show that larger proportionate changes in state foreign-born populations produce 
intensive sociocultural changes that represent a challenge to a state’s ethnic and cultural status quo, 
while generating a higher degree of anti-immigrant sentiment. Studies shows that a considerable 
portion of U.S. voters feel that increased numbers of immigrants contribute to declines in 
employment prospects, safety, and “American” values (Branton et al. 2011; Schildkraut 2005). Others 
show that anti-immigrant rhetoric of political elites are especially influential in areas with higher 
                                                 
1 These states are: South Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Delaware, Arkansas, South Dakota, Nevada, 
Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Wyoming, Idaho, Indiana, and Mississippi. 
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foreign-born growth rates (Hopkins 2010). One piece of circumstantial evidence is that states with a 
higher share of minority voters are more likely to introduce legislation with restrictive voting policies, 
like photo ID requirements (Bentele and O’Brien 2013; Hicks et al. 2015).  
As many U.S. citizens are socialized to think of participating in elections as an American 
civic duty and right, acculturation threat theory anticipates that people are more likely to believe that 
voter fraud is more common in states that experience higher than lower immigration growth. 
Furthermore, it is likely that some mass publics are more threatened by demographic changes, either 
perceived or real. Republicans are more predisposed to oppose immigration and are thus 
disproportionately affected by elite rhetoric on the issue (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Studies 
also show that information about threats from immigration galvanize opposition to immigration 
among Republicans but not among Democrats (Albertson and Gadarian 2012; Hopkins 2014; Knoll, 
Redlawk and Sanborn 2011; Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan 2016). As such, a state’s immigration 
growth is more likely to influence Republican voter fraud perceptions than Democrats.  
DATA AND METHODS 
To test our hypotheses, we use the 2012 Survey on the Performance of American Elections 
(SPAE). The survey utilizes samples of 200 registered voters from all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia, which is designed to produce representative samples of each state’s electorate (Stewart 
2013). The survey design is ideal for examining the relationship between state context and public 
opinion toward election administration. After the 2012 elections, Polimetrix administered the SPAE 
online and surveyed a total of 10,200 adults.  
Dependent Variable 
We measure our main dependent variable using a three-item scale of election fraud beliefs, 
similar to Bowler and Donovan (2016). Respondents are asked how often the following illegal 
practices occur in elections: 1) voters pretending to be someone else; 2) casting a ballot more than 
once; and, 3) people voting who are not U.S. citizens. In each question, we recode responses such 
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that higher numeric values signify stronger beliefs that election fraud occurs: 1) It almost never 
occurs; 2) It occurs infrequently; 3) It occurs occasionally; and, 4) It is very common. We create the 
scale by averaging responses to these three items. Our election fraud scale is highly reliable (α = 
0.90).2 
Contextual variables  
Our main variable of interest is local media coverage of voter fraud stories. Using data from 
Fogarty et al. (2015), we include the number of voter fraud stories featured in each state’s most 
prominent and/or newspaper with the largest circulation from August 1, 2012 through to January 31, 
2013. As Fogarty et al. (2015) argues, “this time frame incorporates the heart of the traditional 
campaign season and allows examination of coverage not just before the election, but also after the 
election when actual vote fraud challenges are likely to occur.” The authors find a total of 680 
articles, with 74% of coverage coming before Election Day. For our analyses in this study, we use 
stories that were published before the election. The Fogarty et al. (2015) dataset also offers the 
number of voter fraud cases that were initiated in 2012 within each state, which provides a proxy for 
an objective number of voting irregularities that are under investigation.  
We use two proxies for a state’s politics surrounding election administrative reforms. We use 
data from a recent initiative that rates each state’s administration of elections based on several 
indicators (Pew Charitable Trusts 2016). The summary rating, called the Election Performance Index 
(EPI), serves as a measure of state election administration in 2012. Higher scores indicate better 
performance, so we expect EPI to be negatively associated with public concerns about voter fraud. 
In addition, we control for the strictness of voter ID laws in a state, as much rhetoric is focused on 
how voter ID laws are supposed to restore public faith in election administration; in spite of research 
that suggests otherwise. We use data on voter identification laws from the National Council on State 
                                                 
2 By excluding the ‘don’t know’ responses, we exclude 1,365 respondents (13%) to the items in the 
voter fraud scale. We verify our results with models that use the full sample and present our results in 
the online appendix of this study.  
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Legislatures (NCSL). Similar to the Bowler and Donovan (2016) study, we categorize states into five 
categories ranging from requiring the least to most restrictive forms of identification: 1) No voter 
restrictions; 2) Non-strict non-photo ID; 3) Non-strict photo ID; 4) Strict non-photo ID; and 5) 
Strict photo ID. 
We also measure state party politics with two indicators. We include a dummy variable for 
battleground states in the 2012 election (CO, FL, IA, NV, NH, NC, OH, VA, WI) to test whether 
exposure to the heaviest competition in the presidential campaign produces more positive 
assessments of electoral fairness (Wolak 2014). To control for additional partisan factors that others 
have shown to influence voter fraud rhetoric and voter identification laws (Hicks et al. 2015), we 
measure the percentage of Republicans in a state legislature.3 
Lastly, to measure perceived threat associated with the U.S. foreign-born population, we use 
three separate population growth indicators from 1990 to 2010. As fraudulently voting in U.S. 
elections with intent is considered a crime (Levitt 2007; Minnite 2010), we measure the growth of 
undocumented immigrants, who are often portrayed as criminals and having socially dysfunctional 
behaviors not fit for mainstream America (Haynes, Merolla and Ramakrishnan 2016). The 
undocumented immigrant population estimates are derived by Warren and Warren (2013) using U.S. 
Census data. As other studies show that political elites and pundits often construct Latinos as the 
stereotypical immigrant in American popular culture (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008; Chavez 
2013), we also measure the growth of non-white Latinos in a state using 5-year estimates from the 
American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census. Lastly, using the same ACS data, we 
measure the growth of a general foreign-born noncitizen population in a state. We use each of the 
three population indicators in separate models to check for robustness, with undocumented 
immigrant growth in the main models.  In light of evidence that shows a strong relationship between 
                                                 
3 According to Ballotpedia, 71% of Nebraska state legislators identify as a Republican. Rather than 
excluding Nebraska from our analysis, we impute this percentage for each Nebraska resident. 
Retrieved at: https://ballotpedia.org/Nebraska_State_Senate_elections,_2016 
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black resentment and support for voter identification requirements (Wilson and Brewer 2013), we 
also control for the growth of a state’s black population from 1990 to 2010. 
Individual-level variables 
We measure party identification on a 3-point scale where 1 indicates a Democrat, 2 indicates 
an Independent, and 3 indicates a Republican.4 Ideology is measured on a 5-point scale, where 1 
indicates a liberal and a 5 indicates a conservative. Respondents are asked for their interest level in 
news and public affairs, with 1 equal to “hardly at all” and 4 equal to “mostly all the time”.5 Since, the 
SPAE does not offer factual questions about party control of political institutions to construct a 
traditional measure of political knowledge, we use education as a proxy of political sophistication. 
Educational attainment is measured with six categories, ranging from people having no high school 
degree to those with a graduate degree. We also control for one’s voting experience and whether a 
person voted by mail or absentee ballot in the 2012 election. Voting experience has been shown to 
moderate partisan perceptions of election administration (Bowler and Donovan 2016). To this end, 
we control for whether a voter reported that he or she showed a form of identification before casting 
a ballot. We use respondent’s sex, age, education, and race as additional control variables.6 
Our statistical models assume that the attitudes of voters are influenced in part by the 
communities in which they are nested. Due to the multilevel structure of the data, we use multilevel 
mixed models to compute unbiased standard errors for model coefficients (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). More specifically, we use a random effects model that estimates 
separate intercepts for each state, which are permitted to vary. We also employ SPAE survey weights 
to obtain our results. We provide a more in-depth description of our statistical models in the online 
                                                 
4 ‘Not Sure’ responses to party identification, which comprises of 2% of the sample – are included 
with Independents. Respondents who are not sure (n=677, 6.4% of sample) to the ideology question 
are categorized with moderates. 
5
 Don’t know responses (1.75% of sample) are excluded. 
6 We make an effort to retain all eight categories with which respondents are offered to identify. We 
combined categories of Native American (80), Other (151), and Middle Eastern (13) to avoid a small 
number of observations that could adversely affect the regression models.   
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appendix. 
RESULTS 
 We employ several multilevel models of voter fraud and show the results in the online 
supplemental materials. Effects are expressed as OLS regression coefficients, with a positive sign 
indicating beliefs that voter fraud is very common and a negative sign indicating beliefs that voter 
fraud does not occur at all. To investigate the variation among like-minded voters, we run separate 
multilevel models on respondents based on their party affiliation. This approach fits with evidence 
and modeling assumptions that voter fraud debates are largely understood in partisan and polarized 
terms (Bowler and Donovan 2016; Wolak 2014).  We first present our baseline results before moving 
on to our key findings on the cross-level interactions with political interest.   
Baseline Results 
Table A-1 in the online appendix presents our results from our baseline regression model.  
We find that state-level factors are able to explain relatively more variation (three times as much) in 
voter fraud perceptions among Independents and Republicans than Democrats; though, most of the 
variation in voter fraud perceptions still exists at the individual-level. Across all three groups, more 
ideologically conservative Democrats, Independents, and Republicans have significantly higher voter 
fraud perceptions than more ideologically liberal ones.  
Two individual-level determinants are specific to Republican voters. Consistent with Bowler 
and Donovan (2016), Republicans who said that they did not show identification at their precincts 
perceived that voter fraud occurs more frequently than others who did show identification. Politically 
interested Republicans are more likely than uninterested ones to believe that voter fraud is very 
common. This suggests that politically interested Republicans may be more susceptible to political 
discourse on voter fraud allegations.  
The partisan models further show racial differences in perceptions, though the mechanism 
involved is unclear. Compared to white voters within their own party, Black Democrats, mixed-race 
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Independents, and Independent and Republican voters who are Middle-Eastern, Native-American, 
or identified as ‘Other’ all perceived that voter fraud occurs more frequently. Some studies suggest 
that higher perceptions of fraud may be tied to feelings of being overlooked by party leaders (Frymer 
2010; Frymer and Skrentny 1998).  Our results may also reflect Black Democrats, who have served as 
targets of voter fraud allegations, picking up elite rhetoric and espousing attitudes that the electoral 
process is a sham. More research is needed to understand the voter fraud perceptions of racial and 
ethnic minority voters who are often the target of elite voter fraud allegations and the extent to 
which they are internalizing those messages.   
Finally, we find minimal evidence that local demographic conditions that theoretically 
instigate perceived racial and acculturation threat matter for voter fraud perceptions. We use 
alternative growth indicators of the foreign-born noncitizen and Latino populations in a state, but 
still find no evidence of any cross-level interactions. Further, as demonstrated in Table 1 below, our 
results show that the growth of undocumented immigration did not moderate perceptions among 
politically interested Republicans, who are theoretically the most aware of voter fraud and 
undocumented immigration. 
Key Findings 
 A key component of our argument is that political interest can have a moderating effect on 
voter fraud beliefs, particularly for Republicans.  In Table 1, we provide a summary of the cross-level 
interactions involving political interest and state contextual indicators from a series of separate 
regression models (see Tables A-2 through A-11 in the online appendix). 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that state media coverage has more influence on 
Republicans than Democrats. Across all models, more ideologically conservative Democrats, 
Independents, and Republicans have significantly higher voter fraud perceptions than more 
ideologically liberal ones. Further, politically interested Republicans are more likely than uninterested 
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ones to believe that voter fraud is very common, suggesting that politically interested Republicans are 
more likely susceptible to political discourse on voter fraud. Across all models of Democratic and 
Independent voters, in contrast, political interest is unrelated to voter fraud beliefs. Our results 
provide strong evidence that media coverage of voter fraud has a larger influence on Republicans 
than Democrats and Independents. Figure 1 compares the marginal effects of news stories on voter 
fraud on perceptions by political interest and party affiliation. Voter fraud perceptions among 
politically interested Republicans increase by 15 percent while decreasing by 21 percent among the 
politically uninterested. Comparatively, we find lesser differences among Democrats and 
Independents. This suggests that Republicans who are less apt to follow the news and politics (at 
least in 2012) are less likely to align their views with the party line on voter fraud and perceive that it 
is rampant in U.S. elections.    
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
The models also provide strong evidence that Republican perceptions of voter fraud are 
influenced by political conditions that signal that their party has less control of the legislative process. 
Party control, though, only matters for Republicans with higher levels of political interest. In states 
with legislatures under Republican control, politically interested Republican voters believe that voter 
fraud is less common than uninterested ones (b = -0.40, s.e. = 0.13, p < 0.01), decreasing by 32 
percent. This also means, as Figure 2 shows, that politically interested Republicans perceive that 
voter fraud occurs more frequently in states where less Republican legislators are elected to office. As 
such, the results indicate that political interest is an important factor that not only polarizes 
perceptions between Republicans and Democrats, but also among Republicans.  
[Insert Figure 2 About Here]  
 Further analysis, though, provides stronger evidence that Republicans, who live in states 
under Democratic Party control, are likely responding to local coverage of voter fraud. Figure 3 plots 
each state according to the proportion of Republicans in the state legislature and voter fraud stories 
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in local media outlets. For reference, we draw a line on the x axis, which indicates equal 
representation between Democrats and Republicans in a legislature. We draw another reference line 
on the y axis, which indicates the median number of voter fraud stories in 2012. The quadrant that 
has the least number of states is the bottom-left: eight Democratic-controlled states have fewer voter 
fraud stories than the median. Eleven states under Democratic Party control (58 percent) have more 
stories than the median. Republican-controlled states are more evenly distributed above (14 states) 
and below (16 states) the median. When taken together, the results suggest that media coverage of 
voter fraud stories in Republican-controlled states are influential on voter fraud perceptions among 
Republican voters, above and beyond which party controls the state legislative apparatus that can be 
used to perpetuate the voter fraud narrative. 
[Insert Figure 3 About Here] 
Conclusion 
Over the past few years, researchers have begun to investigate the origins, nature, and effects 
of voter fraud allegations in U.S. elections. With the increase in elite conservative rhetoric on voter 
fraud and the increasingly punitive response of state legislatures to perceived threats to democracy, 
further study is needed. This study provides a novel and important contribution to our understanding 
through examining the effect the media has on voters’ perceptions of voter fraud. Studying the 
information environment is critical to understanding the apparent disconnect between facts and the 
public’s beliefs about voter fraud. 
In this paper, we demonstrate that increased media coverage of voter fraud is associated with 
heightened public concerns of its prevalence. Supporting anecdotal evidence, we find that 
Republicans are more susceptible to media messaging on fraud than Democrats or independents. 
Further, political interest moderates Republicans’ perceptions – political interested Republicans are 
more likely to believe in the prevalence of voter fraud than others. However, Republican-controlled 
state legislatures appear to mitigated these individuals’ concerns; perhaps suggesting the belief that 
 17 
the prevalence of voter fraud in the state can be curtailed by the legislature.  Lastly, our results lend 
no support that demographic changes, actual cases of fraud, or the approval of election 
administration on the state-level have discernible effects on voter fraud perceptions.  In sum, this 
paper demonstrates the important role the media play in voters’ beliefs of the existence and 
prevalence of voter fraud. 
While this study focuses exclusively on the 2012 elections, widespread voter fraud allegations 
during the 2016 elections makes understanding the information environment even more germane.  
Trump’s unprecedented claims of fraud and election rigging before and after the elections altered the 
prominence of elite rhetoric on the issue.  Instead of fringe Republican and conservatives making 
voter fraud allegations, as seen in the past, 2016 was the first time in modern history that a major 
party presidential candidate was making claims and stoking rhetoric.  Further research into the 
information environment surrounding the 2016 election and the polarizing effect of Trump – 
particularly as a non-traditional Republican candidate – is needed to update and update our 
knowledge of the role of voter fraud in US elections.   
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Table 1. Coefficients of Cross-Level Interactive Terms  
with Political Interest Across Party Affiliation 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
Political interest interacted with: coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.002)** 
% R Legislature -0.03 (0.11) -0.01 (0.21) -0.40 (0.13)** 
Battleground State -0.02 (0.05) 0.15 (0.13) 0.05 (0.05) 
Voter ID Laws 0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) 
EPI Index -0.16 (0.29) 0.47 (0.47) -0.21 (0.34) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases -0.00 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth  0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Foreign-Born Noncitizen Growth 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Latino Growth 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Black Pop. Growth 0.06 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.06) -0.06 (0.03)  
Source: 2012 Survey of Performance of American Elections. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
State-level data are merged from Fogarty et al. (2015), Warren and Warren (2013), and U.S. Census 
ACS data. Each row represents a separate model with the proposed cross-level interaction term. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
METHODS 
Effects are expressed as OLS regression coefficients, with a positive sign indicating beliefs that voter 
fraud is very common and a negative sign indicating beliefs that voter fraud does not occur at all. To 
investigate the variation among like-minded voters, we run separate multilevel models on respondents based 
on their party affiliation. This approach fits with evidence and modeling assumptions that voter fraud debates 
are largely understood in partisan and polarized terms (Bowler and Donovan 2016; Wolak 2014).  
Our statistical models assume that the attitudes of voters are influenced in part by the 
communities in which they are nested. Due to the multilevel structure of the data, we use multilevel 
mixed models to compute unbiased standard errors for model coefficients (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). We also employ SPAE survey weights to obtain our results. 
Following the notation of Rudolph and Rahn (2005) For each partisan group, our proposed level-1 
statistical model is expressed generally as: 
Voter fraud beliefsij = β0j + β1j  Political Interestij + β2j  Ideologyij 
       β3j  ShowIDij + β4j  Educationij + β5j  Ageij +  
       β6j  Femaleij + β7j  Blackij + β8j  Hispanicij + 
       β9j  Asianij + β10j  NA/ME/Otherij + β11j  Mixedij  + rij  [1] 
where βkj represents the individual-level effect associated with a proposed indepdent variable, β0j is 
an intercept, and rij  is an individual disturbance term. Voter fraud beliefsij then represents the extent 
to which an ith respondent living in the jth state believes that voter fraud occurs in U.S. elections. 
The effects of state-level conditions are expressed as a level-2 model of the intercept:    
β0j  = γ00 + γ 01  Undoc. Pop. Growthj + γ 02  Black Growthj +  
γ 03  EPI Indexj + γ 04  State Voter ID Scorej +  
γ 05  %Republicanj + γ 06  Battlegroundj +  
γ 07  Voter Fraud Storiesj + γ 08  Voter Fraud Casesj + u0j  [2] 
where β0j  represents the mean level of voter fraud beliefs in state j, γ00 represents the average 
intercept across all states, each γ represents a state fixed-effect, and u0j is a level-2 disturbance term.  
We also theorize that each proposed contextual factor will moderate the effect of political 
interst on voter fraud perceptions. We test cross-level interactions involving political interest by 
modeling the slope of political interest (β1j) as:  
 β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 11  Undoc. Pop. Growthj                    [3] 
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 12  Black Growthj                           [4] 
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 13  EPI Indexj                             [5] 
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 14  State Voter IDj                            [6] 
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 15  Republican % Legislatirej                    [7]   
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 16  Battlegroundj                            [8]   
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 17  Voter Fraud Storiesj                            [9]   
β1j =   γ 10 +  γ 18  Voter Fraud Casesj                          [10]   
After substituting each equation from 3 to 10 into equation 1, we estimate the full model using a 
multilevel model using OLS regression.   
 Table A-1. Results from Base Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Perceptions 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.04 (0.03)  -0.00 (0.04) 0.11 (0.03)*** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.14 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.09 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.37 (0.12)** 0.29 (0.31) -0.69 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.21) 0.04 (0.54) 0.41 (0.57) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.29 (0.17)*** 1.86 (0.39)*** 2.11 (0.46)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 526.17 *** 80.00*** 94.08*** 
Variation Explained by Level-1 99% 96% 96% 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
Table A-2. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and State Media Coverage of Voter Fraud 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.002)** 
Individual-Level     
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.06)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.08 (0.04)  -0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.03) 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.08) -0.17 (0.05)*** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.05) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.14 (0.13) -0.16 (0.17) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.10 (0.17) 0.02 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.08 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.06 (0.10) 0.30 (0.15)* 0.30 (0.14)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.02 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)  
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)  
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.38 (0.12)** 0.30 (0.32) -0.70 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.21) 0.05 (0.53) 0.43 (0.57) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.40 (0.20)*** 1.95 (0.42)*** 2.32 (0.46)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 556.67 *** 95.40 *** 111.01*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table A-3. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Electoral Competition in 2012  
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X Battleground  -0.02 (0.05) 0.15 (0.13) 0.05 (0.05) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.06)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04) 0.10 (0.03)*** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04) -0.03 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.13 (0.06)* -0.15 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.07 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.09 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.14)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.29 (0.12)* 0.08 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground 0.07 (0.15) -0.51 (0.38) -0.05 (0.18) 
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.37 (0.12)** 0.29 (0.31) -0.69 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.22) 0.04 (0.53) 0.42 (0.57) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.27 (0.17)*** 1.93 (0.39)*** 2.14 (0.46)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 556.27 *** 101.85 *** 95.82 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table A-4. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Percentage Growth of State Undocumented 
Immigrant Population 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest  X Undoc. Pop. Growth  0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.05 (0.04) -0.03 (0.06) 0.09 (0.03)** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)*** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.13 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.09 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.08 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.37 (0.12)** 0.29 (0.31) -0.69 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.22) 0.03 (0.54) 0.41 (0.58) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.30 (0.20)*** 1.97 (0.42)*** 2.17 (0.48)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 556.45 *** 80.97 *** 99.98 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table A-5. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Percentage Growth of State Black Population 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X Black Pop. Growth 0.06 (0.03)* -0.09 (0.06) -0.06 (0.03)  
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.28 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.08 (0.03)** 0.06 (0.06) 0.15 (0.04)*** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)*** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.05) 
Black 0.13 (0.06)* -0.14 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.02 (0.08) -0.07 (0.17) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.02 (0.11) 0.07 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.06 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.14)* 
Mixed -0.06 (0.09) 0.26 (0.12)* 0.08 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.10) 0.13 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.22 (0.10)* 0.09 (0.18) 0.15 (0.14) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.37 (0.12)** 0.30 (0.32) -0.70 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.08 (0.22) 0.01 (0.54) 0.41 (0.58) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.40 (0.18)*** 1.68 (0.42)*** 1.97 (0.46)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 574.19 *** 81.99 *** 94.93 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table A-6. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Voter ID Laws 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X Voter ID Laws 0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.09 (0.04)* 0.05 (0.09) 0.12 (0.05)* 
Show ID -0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.05) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.14 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.06 (0.17) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.08 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.15)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.29 (0.12)* 0.08 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID -0.06 (0.05) 0.05 (0.09) 0.04 (0.07) 
% R Legislature -0.38 (0.12)** 0.29 (0.31) -0.69 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.07 (0.22) 0.01 (0.54) 0.42 (0.58) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.44 (0.20)*** 1.72 (0.45)*** 2.04 (0.48)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 554.79 *** 88.49 *** 95.16 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
 
Table A-7. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Percentage of Republicans in State Legislature 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X % R Legislature -0.03 (0.11) -0.01 (0.21) -0.40 (0.13)** 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.03 (0.07) 0.00 (0.12) 0.33 (0.08)*** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.03)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.13 (0.06)* -0.14 (0.13) -0.15 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.09 (0.16) 0.00 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.17) -0.11 (0.22) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.10 (0.14) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.01 (0.11) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.27 (0.38) 0.32 (0.64) 0.70 (0.50) 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.22) 0.04 (0.54) 0.43 (0.58) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.24 (0.25)*** 1.85 (0.47)*** 1.28 (0.49)** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 517.57*** 82.54 *** 94.48 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
  
 
Table A-8. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Perceptions with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and State EPI Index 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X EPI Index -0.16 (0.29) 0.47 (0.47) -0.21 (0.34) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.06)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest 0.07 (0.21) -0.32 (0.31) 0.25 (0.23) 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04) -0.03 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.16 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.09 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.09 (0.16) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.14) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) -0.03 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00)  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.37 (0.12)** 0.32 (0.31) -0.69 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index 0.44 (0.98) -1.35 (1.41) 1.14 (1.30) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 1.93 (0.67)** 2.79 (0.95)** 1.62 (0.90)  
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 605.20*** 82.87*** 91.96*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
Table A-9. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Perceptions with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Alleged Voter Fraud Cases in State 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X Alleged Voter Fraud Cases -0.00 (0.01) 0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05) 0.11 (0.03)*** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)*** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04)  -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.11 (0.14) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.10 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) 
Asian 0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.13)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.27 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground -0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Undoc. Pop. Growth 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Black pop. -0.02 (0.03) -0.19 (0.08)* -0.07 (0.06) 
Voter ID 0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.37 (0.12)** 0.30 (0.32) -0.69 (0.20)*** 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.21) -0.06 (0.56) 0.42 (0.57) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.03) -0.14 (0.09) 0.04 (0.03) 
_cons 2.29 (0.17)*** 2.00 (0.39)*** 2.10 (0.46)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 760.70 *** 80.34 *** 95.98 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
Table A-10. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Percentage Growth of State Foreign-Born 
Noncitizen Population 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X FB Noncitizen Growth 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.08 (0.04)* -0.04 (0.07) 0.11 (0.05)* 
Show ID -0.04 (0.04) -0.03 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04) -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.12 (0.13) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.09 (0.16) 0.00 (0.16) 
Asian 0.02 (0.11) 0.07 (0.17) -0.11 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.29 (0.14)* 
Mixed -0.06 (0.09) 0.28 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground 0.00 (0.04) 0.00 (0.10) 0.15 (0.07)* 
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Foreign-born Noncitizen Growth -0.03 (0.05) -0.04 (0.07) 0.03 (0.05) 
Black pop. -0.03 (0.03) -0.20 (0.07)** -0.09 (0.07) 
Voter ID 0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.47 (0.12)*** 0.27 (0.34) -0.74 (0.22)*** 
EPI Index -0.12 (0.21) 0.02 (0.54) 0.39 (0.57) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
_cons 2.46 (0.18)*** 2.01 (0.43)*** 2.16 (0.49)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 620.65 *** 88.76 *** 94.93 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Table A-11. Results from Multilevel Models of Voter Fraud Beliefs with Cross-Level 
Interaction Between Political Interest and Percentage Growth of State Latino Population 
 
 Democrats Independents Republicans 
 coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) 
Cross-Level Interaction    
Pol. Interest X Latino Growth 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
Individual-Level    
Ideology 0.20 (0.04)*** 0.27 (0.07)*** 0.12 (0.05)* 
Political Interest -0.07 (0.04)* 0.01 (0.06) 0.12 (0.04)** 
Show ID -0.03 (0.04) -0.02 (0.08) -0.16 (0.05)** 
Education -0.07 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** 
Age -0.01 (0.00)*** -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)* 
Female -0.06 (0.04) -0.02 (0.07) -0.06 (0.04) 
Black 0.14 (0.06)* -0.13 (0.12) -0.17 (0.18) 
Hispanic 0.03 (0.08) -0.10 (0.16) 0.00 (0.16) 
Asian 0.02 (0.11) 0.07 (0.17) -0.12 (0.23) 
NA/ME/Other -0.05 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14)* 0.28 (0.14)* 
Mixed -0.05 (0.09) 0.27 (0.12)* 0.07 (0.13) 
State-Level    
Battleground 0.00 (0.05) -0.00 (0.10) 0.15 (0.08)  
Voter Fraud Stories 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
Latino Growth -0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 
Black pop. -0.03 (0.03) -0.20 (0.07)** -0.09 (0.07) 
Voter ID 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 
% R Legislature -0.39 (0.12)** 0.34 (0.33) -0.67 (0.22)** 
EPI Index -0.09 (0.21) -0.01 (0.54) 0.37 (0.58) 
Alleged Voter Fraud Cases 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 
_cons 2.41 (0.19)*** 1.90 (0.41)*** 2.15 (0.49)*** 
Level-1 Obs.  3909 1047 3575 
Level-2 Obs. 50 50 50 
Wald X2 584.72 *** 87.65 *** 95.25 *** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
